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Abstract
Dam safety is a significant issue being taken seriously worldwide. However, in Australia, although much attention is being 
devoted to the medium- to large-scale dams, minimal attention is being paid to the serious potential problems associated 
with smaller dams, particularly the potential cumulative safety threats they pose in catchments. This paper establishes 
the significance of this problem and reviews various Australian policies, including consideration of evidence from past 
research, to identify the potentially more effective policies with respect to smaller dams/cumulative safety assurance. New 
‘case studies’ research that recently tested the effectiveness and coverage of the “strong” dam-safety policy of New South 
Wales (NSW) is then reported. The case studies comprised 2 samples of 10 hazardous private reservoirs investigated for 
spillway adequacy in line with state-of-the-art practice: one sample comprised dams supervised under the NSW policy, 
while the other sample comprised only non-supervised dams. The case studies show the potential effectiveness of strong 
policy, but also the importance of registering all dams and the need for some form of supervision of even small dams due 
to either their individual or cumulative hazard potential. The State of Tasmania provides a ‘model’ on how this can be best 
achieved in line with international best-practice, and this recently became the focus of a comprehensive study. This study 
involved strategic consideration and assessment of policy responses to the varying issues associated with small-dam safety 
and practical feedback from key policy actors. The results of this study are also reported here to provide guidance to any 
other jurisdiction world-wide needing to manage numerous small dams posing cumulative safety threats in catchments.
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Introduction
In Australia, a clear problem exists with private dam safety: 
Australia has a large number of relatively small, privately 
owned dams (farm dams especially, numbering approxi-
mately 480 000 (Price et al., 2003)) and those which have 
failed number in the thousands. The Australian National 
Committee on Large Dams (ANCOLD) in 1992 estimated 
that 23% of farm dams in NSW had failed (ANCOLD, 1992). 
In Tasmania around 500 of the 8 000 registered dams are of 
significant potential safety risk (DPIWE, 2005, p.21;  
Ditchfield, 2008). In Victoria 800 of the 170 000 farm dams 
are hazardous (Murley, 1987), and Lewis and Harrison 
(2002) reported that at least 10 significant failures have 
occurred in Victoria in the past decade. The policy responses 
of various States to these farm-dam safety threats are 
reviewed here.
 One of the main concerns is that most private dams 
are deprived of necessary maintenance and upgrading and 
downstream communities are placed at risk. This problem 
was demonstrated by recent case studies undertaken in the 
‘still’ policy-absent State of South Australia and the ‘now’ 
policy-driven State of Victoria (Pisaniello and McKay, 
2005). These case studies showed that giving only more 
time, awareness and encouragement to landholders addresses 
the problem to a minimal extent – adequate assurance can 
only be provided through appropriate policy which requires 
the backing of law-makers, and effective and efficient 
administration of laws is also vital.
 In this paper, the significance of this small-dam safety 
problem, particularly in relation to the cumulative threats they 
pose within larger catchments, is established. NSW has had 
a specific Dams Safety Act in place since 1978 which repre-
sents ‘strong’ dam-safety assurance policy (Pisaniello and 
McKay, 1998). This strong policy was recently tested for its 
effectiveness and coverage, particularly in relation to smaller 
yet hazardous dams. The results are reported here to provide 
comparative policy guidance. Tasmania recently implemented 
policy on private dam safety which effectively deals with all 
the issues raised by Pisaniello and McKay (2005) as barri-
ers to achieving private dam-safety programmes in other 
states. The Tasmanian policy therefore became the focus of a 
comprehensive study. This study involved strategic considera-
tion and assessment of policy responses to the varying issues 
associated with small-dam safety and practical feedback from 
key policy actors. The results of this study are also reported 
here to provide lessons and guidance to any other jurisdiction 
world-wide: any jurisdiction needing to manage numerous 
small dams that pose either significant individual or cumula-
tive threats in catchments.
Dam-safety management in Australia and the 
small-dam safety problem
In Australia, as in most countries, owner obligation exists 
under common law to take reasonable care of dams according 
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to current prevailing standards. Hence, owners should review 
their dams, and take appropriate action where necessary, in 
order to minimise the risk of failure and avoid liability for pos-
sible consequences of failure (McKay and Pisaniello, 1995).
How dam safety is managed in Australia
Most Australian Government dam-owning agencies have 
assumed the responsibility of evaluating public dams in  
terms of risk in accordance with current guidelines, and  
subsequently have either undertaken or are implementing 
appropriate action, at massive costs, to reduce the risks to 
modern acceptable standards. For example, in NSW safety 
upgrades on Pindari and Warragamba Dams were recently 
completed at a cost of AU$68.8 m. (ZAR442 m.) and  
AU$100 m. (ZAR643 m.) respectively (NSW Department 
of Land and Water Conservation, 1995; NSW DSC, 2003). 
In South Australia, extensive safety studies and subsequent 
upgrading have recently been commissioned for most public 
dams, e.g.: Mount Bold Reservoir (Daniell and Hill, 1993), 
Kangaroo Creek Dam (Lange Dames Campbell (SA) (Pty.) 
Ltd. and Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation, 1995), 
and Happy Valley Reservoir (BC Tonkin and Associates, 
1997). However, as reported in Pisaniello and McKay (2005), 
there is a policy vacuum in mainland Australia on private 
dam-safety policy, except partially in NSW (Dams Safety 
Act, 1978), Victoria (Water Act, 1989) and Queensland 
(Water Act, 2000), but even their policies are not pervasive. 
That is, they only address the problems associated with  
hazardous dams, usually the larger, more significant on-
stream dams, without giving due consideration to the prob-
lems associated with the multitude of smaller off-stream 
catchment dams nor the supervision over the management of 
these structures.  In contrast, Tasmania has addressed these 
problems and a more detailed discussion on this ‘model’ 
policy is provided below (see section titled: Dam-safety 
assurance in Tasmania: A ‘model’ policy). 
 In Victoria an attempt has recently been made to address 
this ‘smaller dams’ safety problem by incorporating amend-
ments to the Water Act 1989, see Pisaniello and McKay (2005). 
However, research has demonstrated that while the recent 
policy and law reforms are a step in the right direction for  
Victoria, efficient and effective administration of the policy is 
just as important (Pisaniello and McKay, 2005).
 In Queensland, key water allocation provisions have been 
incorporated into the Water Act 2000 together with dam-safety 
provisions that target ‘referable’ dams. Unfortunately, the  
definition of ‘referable’ dams, generally, only catches ones 
higher than 8 m and with 250 Mℓ capacity or more. Based on 
Pisaniello and Mckay (1998), this is too lenient compared to 
world wide standards. Hence, many hazardous smaller off-
stream dams may go unsupervised in Queensland.
 In NSW, any issues of dam safety are left entirely up 
to the Dams Safety Act 1978 and the Dams Safety Com-
mittee (DSC) constituted under it. The Dams Safety Act 
represents best practice legislation when compared to inter-
national standards in terms of the sort of dams that should 
be prescribed under the Act and the levels of supervision 
and responsibility imposed upon dam owners (Pisaniello 
and McKay, 1998; Bradlow et al., 2002; further details also 
provided later in this paper). Unfortunately the Dams Safety 
Act does not appear to provide for an adequate register of all 
dams (including small ones) in the State, nor does it provide 
for an adequate budget to enable the DSC to supervise more 
dams than are already prescribed. Hence, many of the smaller 
off-stream dams which nevertheless pose significant hazard 
downstream, either individually or cumulatively, may go un-
noticed. This is demonstrated by recent case studies, which 
are reported later in this paper (see section headed: Spillway 
adequacy case studies in NSW).
The significance of the small-dam safety problem
As discussed above, Australia has many small, privately 
owned dams that are poorly maintained, thousands of which 
have failed. At the same time more farm dams have been built 
to capture water as changes to the water allocation policies in 
Australia have been mooted since the early 1990s (McKay, 
2001).  Studies have shown that in general dams fail more 
so by overtopping due to inadequate spillway capacity: this 
failure mode represents around 40% of all recorded failures 
worldwide (Foster et al, 2000, p.1005) and embankment dams 
(which typifies private dams) are the most susceptible rep-
resenting 70% of these (Pisaniello, 1997; ANCOLD, 1992; 
1995).
 While failures of large dams are generally more spectacu-
lar than those of smaller dams and receive much more atten-
tion, small-dam failures, particularly those of privately-owned 
farm dams, occur far more frequently (also supported by 
Lewis and Harrison, 2002). Therefore, in many cases, the total 
annual cost of small-dam failures is more serious than the rare 
failures of large dams. Also, past events have occurred where 
failures of relatively small dams have caused quite disastrous 
consequences. For example, in China the Shimantan and Ban-
qiao Dams failed in 1975 as a result of the cumulative failure 
of 60 smaller upstream dams, resulting in the death of  
230 000 people (Si and Quing, 1998). In Italy, the Stava Dam 
near Trento failed in 1985 and while releasing only 180 Mℓ 
of tailings material, it killed 268 people and caused serious 
environmental impact (Engels, 2005). In the United States, 
the Kelly Barnes Lake Dam, only 8 m high, failed in 1977 
killing a total of 39 people; and the Lake Lawn Dam in Colo-
rado which was also 8 m high and stored only 830 Mℓ, failed 
in 1982 drowning 3 people and causing US$31 million in 
damage despite warnings and evacuation (Hiser & McDonald, 
1989). Also in the US, the Evans and Lockwood dams, which 
were only around 5 m high and held only 89 Mℓ and 39 Mℓ 
of water respectively, both overtopped and failed in a cascade 
manner in 1989 killing 2 people (Graham, 1999). 
 A study by Graham (1999) of dam failures in the US result-
ing in fatalities from 1960 to 1998, found that the failure of 
dams less than 15 m high (which is the typical height range of 
smaller dams) caused 88% of the deaths. The study also found 
that the failure of dams less than 6 m high (i.e. very small 
dams) caused 2% of the deaths. These past events demonstrate 
that without appropriate design, construction, maintenance and 
surveillance, poorly managed small dams can pose significant 
individual and cumulative threats, and can cause considerable 
human, property and environmental losses to the community.
 This paper looks to address 2 main concerns with small 
dams in Australia in line with international experience and 
practice as follows.
Concern 1: Inadequate dam construction and 
maintenance
Many private dams are unsafe due to improper design, particu-
larly flood capability design, and general lack of review and 
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maintenance: failure can result which can impact badly on the 
immediate downstream inundation zone. This concern arises 
because: 
• Most landholders hire contractors to build their dams: 
contractors that are typically not properly trained or skilled 
in the engineering design of dams 
• Dam owners are generally complacent with dam surveil-
lance, review and maintenance 
• The typical probabilities required for design floods are 
beyond the average farmer’s comprehension.
Pisaniello and McKay (2005) and the NSW case studies 
reported below validate this concern. 
Concern 2: Potential impact of cumulative failure of 
many small dams
The lack of safety of the small dams individually can lead to 
cumulative failure during medium to large floods which can 
produce a flood with severe downstream consequences. This 
was demonstrated by the Shimantan and Banqiao Dam failures 
in China and the Evans and Lockwood Dam failures in the  
US discussed above. It was also demonstrated in the Adelaide 
Hills of South Australia in 1992- extreme weather delivering 
rainfall events of 1-in-60 years, resulted in widespread  
damaging floods from ‘farm dam failures [that] provided addi-
tional problems and contributed to the overall damage costs’ 
(Harrison, 1992). 
 It was also found to be of concern in a flood study of the 
large public Kangaroo Creek Dam in the Torrens catchment 
of South Australia (LDC & SMEC, 1995). The modelling 
procedure adopted in the River Torrens study was reported by 
Kazarovski (1996). The study found that the peak inflow to 
Kangaroo Creek Dam would increase fourfold and cause it to 
fail assuming all the small dams in the catchment failed at the 
same time in an extreme design flood event of only 1-in-200 
years, compared to the flow estimated if the dams remained 
intact. The cumulative failure of these small dams was a 
reasonable assumption given that later Pisaniello and McKay 
(2005) found that most small dams in South Eastern Australia 
would not withstand the 1-in-100 years design flood event. The 
River Torrens study thus recognised the need for ‘controlling 
the standard of construction of farm dams and their spillways’ 
(LDC and SMEC, 1995).
 Added is the problem that global warming is causing 
extreme flood events to become more probable (UN IPCC, 
2007); hence the likelihood of disastrous, cumulative-style dam 
failures in Australia increases even more.
 If small dams are located upstream with potential to cause 
cascade failure of larger more hazardous dams, then ANCOLD 
(2000a, p.10) warns that ‘the combined effect of multiple dam 
failures should be the basis of the hazard category of the upper 
dams.’  This guideline interpreted strictly, and together with 
the findings of LDC and SMEC (1995) and Kazarovski (1996), 
would deem that in certain circumstances, all small dams in 
a catchment upstream of a large, high-hazard public reservoir 
should also be treated as high hazard (due to their potential 
cumulative failure impact), and should therefore each individu-
ally meet the same design standard. This area does require 
further research into the kind of small-dam populations and 
overall storage volumes that are critical for different catchment 
circumstances. However, it has nevertheless become clear that 
all small dams in catchments of large public dams should be 
registered and at least controlled for spillway adequacy regard-
less of their size and individual hazard potential. They should 
be mandated to at least meet ANCOLD’s minimum fall-back 
design criteria for low or significant hazard dams (i.e. 1 in 100 
to 1 in 1 000 years design flood), and upgraded to a higher 
standard when clearly warranted in cumulative or cascade 
failure scenarios. 
 Internationally, many countries, including Canada, Finland, 
Portugal, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the US, have 
recently adopted safety regulation and surveillance acts in an 
attempt to ensure the safety of both public and private dams. 
Pisaniello and McKay (1998 and 2003) provide more detailed 
comparative analyses of the varying criteria used in these 
countries to regulate dams, including size class, hazard poten-
tial, surveillance levels and spillway adequacy standards. The 
analyses by Pisaniello and McKay (1998 and 2003) demonstrate 
that certain countries have regulated dams as small as 1.8 m 
high (Michigan, USA) and with a minimum storage capac-
ity of 25 Mℓ (UK) regardless of dam hazard potential, hence 
recognising the need to assure the safety of even the smallest 
of dams. In Australia, Tasmania is the only state thus far to 
acknowledge that, even small dams need to be supervised in 
such a way, as demonstrated below (see section titled: Dam-
safety assurance in Tasmania: A ‘model’ policy). 
Spillway adequacy case studies in NSW – 
testing a ‘strong’ dam-safety assurance policy 
and its coverage of regulated dams
As discussed above, dam safety in NSW is regulated under the 
Dams Safety Act 1978 and supervised by the DSC. The  
Committee, consisting of 8 part-time members, is independent 
of any Government agencies which construct or own dams.  
The Committee is funded by the State Government and  
currently operates on a small annual budget of around  
AU$1 000 000 (ZAR6 430 000) (NSW DSC, 2007). The Com-
mittee has the responsibility for setting standards and monitor-
ing their observance for prescribed dams – its standards are 
based on Australian guidelines developed with a background 
of international practice (NSW DSC, 2007). Prescribed dams 
are those listed in Schedule 1 of the Act which is progressively 
amended by additions or deletions. Dams are prescribed on 
the recommendation of the Committee. A dam is normally 
prescribed if it is greater than 15 m in height or if it is a smaller 
dam with either a high or significant hazard rating – in general, 
dams with a wall height of less than 5 m are only prescribed 
if a high hazard potential is posed (NSW DSC, 1993). In 2007 
there were 334 prescribed dams in NSW, with only around 100 
being privately owned (NSW DSC, 2007, p.36). Hence, many 
smaller off-stream dams which are hazardous may only be 
prescribed if and when they come to the attention of the DSC, 
otherwise they go unnoticed.
 In order to independently test the effectiveness of this 
system, 2 case studies were recently undertaken as part of an 
Australian Research Council Discovery Project.
Case-study procedure
The case studies involved determining the modern flood 
capabilities of 2 samples each comprising 10 hazardous private 
reservoirs: the first sample consisted of prescribed embankment 
‘farm-type’ dams which were supervised by the DSC, while 
the second sample consisted of dams that were not under the 
supervision of the DSC. A brief outline of the procedure is as 
follows:
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• The 10 ‘farm-type’ dams in the DSC-supervised sam-
ple were randomly selected from the 100 or so privately 
owned dams contained in Schedule 1 of the Act. The fact 
that they were prescribed deemed them to be hazardous in 
nature. The 10 dams in the non-supervised sample were 
selected randomly from aerial photography and topo-
graphic maps on the basis that they be ‘referable’ in size 
and either ‘significant’ or ‘high hazard’ in accordance with 
ANCOLD (2000a and 2000b) guidelines. The criteria used 
by ANCOLD for its 3 main hazard classifications can be 
summarised as follows:
 - High Hazard Potential – dam failure will endanger 
many lives in a downstream community and will cause 
extensive damage
 - Significant Hazard Potential –failure may endanger 
some lives and will cause extensive damage
 - Low Hazard Potential – failure poses minimal risk to 
life and will cause limited damage
• Each of the dam sites in the non-supervised sample was 
visited and spillway/embankment sizes were measured 
using appropriate survey equipment. Only some of the 
dam sites in the DSC-supervised sample were visited as 
in most cases spillway/embankment sizes could be readily 
obtained from independent engineering reports and data 
contained in the DSC files. Catchment and reservoir areas 
were determined from 1:25000 scale topographic maps and 
aerial photos.
• The sample dams were all embankment-type structures and 
had typical spillways that were free flowing and weir-type 
in nature. The main physical characteristics of each dam 
are presented in Tables 1 and 2. In summary, the maximum 
wall heights of the dams ranged from 4 m to 23 m for the 
DSC-supervised dams and 6.5 m to 18.5 m for the non-
supervised dams; their storage capacities ranged from  
60 Mℓ to 1 450 Mℓ for the DSC-supervised dams and  
50 Mℓ to 900 Mℓ for the non-supervised dams; and the size 
of their catchments ranged from 0.2 km2 to 20 km2 for the 
DSC-supervised dams and from 0.2 km2 to 3.5 km2 for the 
non-supervised dams.
• The regionalised flood capability design/review procedure, 
described in Pisaniello and McKay (2003 and 2005), was 
used to determine the dam crest flood (DCF) capability of 
each dam, being the flood which, when routed through the 
reservoir results in a peak storage level equal to the low-
est elevation on the non-overflow crest (as recommended 
by ANCOLD, 2000b for embankment dams). The proce-
dure enabled the DCF of each dam to be determined as an 
annual exceedance probability (AEP), which is presented 
as 1/AEP in years in Tables 1 and 2. It should be noted that 
the regionalised procedure had been previously developed 
based on Australian best-practice catchment analysis, 
calibration and modelling, flood hydrology and reservoir 
hydraulics, all in line with IEAust (1999). The procedure is 
simple, yet scientifically acceptable, and was specifically 
developed for small dams on small catchments to promote 
consistency and uniform standards. It can be used to either 
review or design the flood capability of such dams for all 
possible design flood events up to the Probable Maximum 
Flood (PMF). For a full description of the primary devel-
opment of this technology, see Pisaniello et al. (1999); 
for development in NSW specifically, see Pisaniello and 
McKay (2004).
 The DCF capability of each dam was determined for 
both an upper bound and lower bound ‘start’ storage level 
case for the non-supervised dams only:
 - Upper bound case – initial storage level assumed 100% 
full
 - Lower bound case – initial storage level assumed 33% 
full.
The lower bound case is highly non-conservative, and was 
checked for the non-supervised dams to minimise uncertainty. 
For the DSC-supervised dams, the most conservative upper 
bound case was imposed, and the dams were found to all pass 
the requisite standard; hence, there was no need to check the 
lower bound case.
 The case-study results are presented in the following sec-
tion (see Tables 1 and 2).
Case-study results and analysis
The results of the case studies were analysed by comparing 
them against ANCOLD criteria as illustrated in Tables 1 and 2 
for the DSC-supervised and the non-supervised sample respec-
tively.
 ANCOLD (2000b) guidelines recommend that unless nor-
TABLE 1






























1 23 1450 15 Sig. 1 100 10 000-1000 Yes
2 6.1 174 2.1 Sig. 475 000 10 000-1000 Yes
3 17.5 1200 20 Sig. 40 000 10 000-1000 Yes
4 5 95 3.5 High 12 500 PMF-10 000 Yes
5 4.5 60 0.8 High 310 000 PMF-10 000 Yes
6 7 65 3.2 Sig. 55 000 10 000-1000 Yes
7 12 250 0.3 Sig. 6 000 000 10 000-1000 Yes
8 4 135 14 Sig. 1050 10 000-1000 Yes
9 5 380 0.2 High 10 000 000 PMF-10 000 Yes
10 14 270 0.2 High 10 000 000 PMF-10 000 Yes
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mal operating conditions indicate otherwise, a 100% full ‘start’ 
storage level should be assumed when assessing spillway flood 
capability of embankment dams. The comparisons in Tables 2 
demonstrate that regardless of the ‘start’ storage level assumed, 
potentially hazardous private reservoirs with inadequate 
spillway capacities do exist in NSW. The risk of failure from 
overtopping is consistently unacceptable for 80% of the total 
non-supervised sample. At the same time, the flood capabilities 
of 30% of the non-supervised dams do not satisfy the required 
criteria even when the ‘lower-bound’ non-conservative assump-
tion is applied (i.e. that the dam is always 33% full at the begin-
ning of any storm). In contrast, and not surprisingly, 100% of 
the DSC-supervised sample met the necessary modern standard 
for spillway safety.
 These results reinforce the fact that private dam own-
ers, unless they are regulated and supervised, will not take 
action in terms of analysis and upgrading of their struc-
tures. The perfect results from the DSC-supervised sample 
demonstrate the effectiveness of a properly administered 
dam-safety assurance policy. However, at the same time, the 
results from the non-supervised sample demonstrate that 
without adequate register of all dams in NSW, and proper 
mechanisms in place for identifying all significant dams, 
many such dams can and do escape regulation and compli-
ance. It is also clear that the DSC would need more funding 
to extend its supervisory remit, and hence, this may neces-
sitate some ‘user pays’. 
Dam-safety assurance in Tasmania: A ‘model’ 
policy
Tasmania has over 30% of Australia’s total water storage 
capacity, and in the past few years there has been a large 
expansion of storages for irrigation underway, to support the 
sustainable expansion of agricultural production (DPIWE, 
2003 and 2005). Hence, the Tasmanian Government rec-
ognised the need to tighten legislative controls in order to 
ensure the safety of dams in Tasmania. This was achieved 
firstly in late 2002 by making amendments to the Water 
Management Act 1999 (Tas), and then in November the fol-
lowing year passing the Water Management (Safety of Dams) 
Regulations 2003, which are now in operation across the 
State.
 The legislation was introduced in line with the Tasmanian 
Government’s policy to improve safety arrangements for the 
community and the environment.  It was considered inade-
quate to solely rely on the non-statutory ‘duty-of-care’ princi-
ples to ensure that dams were maintained in a safe condition.  
The legislation was developed in close consultation with dam 
experts from government agencies, the Hydro and the mining 
industry, and with key stakeholder groups such as primary 
producers and local government. The Minister responsible 
pointed out that in developing the dam-safety legislative 
framework, the Government’s objective had been to achieve 
the appropriate balance between, on the one hand, ensuring 
public and environmental protection and on the other, impos-
ing restrictive and expensive requirements on dam builders 
and owners (DPIWE, 2003).
Description of the dam-safety legislation
The legislation provides for specific safety measures to be 
required for the design, construction and operation of all dams 
that hold 1 or more Mℓ of water or waste, based on their haz-
ard potential to the community, see Section 165A of the Water 
Management Act 1999 and Part 2 of the Water Management 
(Safety of Dams) Regulations 2003.
 Essentially, under the Act all proposed new dams must 
obtain a permit (Part 8) and all existing dams have to be reg-
istered (Part 8A). The Act is administered by the Department 
of Primary Industries, Water and Environment (DPIWE), 
and an Assessment Committee constituted under the Act 
(see Section 138). It should be noted that DPIWE is now the 
Department of Primary Industries and Water (DPIW). The 
main role of the Assessment Committee is to assess all new 
dam permit applications. The Committee must consist of 6 
members appointed by the Minister and nominated by vari-
ous organisations in order to ensure a collective expertise in 
areas such as water resources, dams engineering and safety, 
integrated natural resource management and best practice 
environmental management (see Section 139). The permit 
process also requires public advertisement of any new dam 
TABLE 2











































1 9.6 124 0.52 High 53 000 1 000 000 PMF-10 000 Yes Yes
2 9.2 73 0.29 Sig. 900 46 000 10 000-1000 Yes No
3 8.0 60 0.40 High 2 500 37 000 PMF-10 000 Yes No
4 6.5 50 0.20 Sig. 590 50 000 10 000-1000 Yes No
5 18.5 900 1.25 High 100 000 10 000 000 PMF-10 000 Yes Yes
6 9 150 3.50 Sig. 10 80 10 000-1000 No No
7 6.9 64 0.20 Sig. 125 850 10 000-1000 No No
8 8 83 0.67 Sig. 500 4 500 10 000-1000 Yes No
9 9 67 0.47 Sig. 80 900 10 000-1000 No No
10 8.2 55 0.24 Sig. 750 20 000 10 000-1000 Yes No
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proposals prior to any permit being granted (DPIW, 2008). 
This enables DPIW to hear and consider any objections to 
the proposal from the community, and also satisfies inter-
national best-practice ‘community right to know’ princi-
ples (Pisaniello and McKay, 1998). The ongoing safety of 
existing dams is supervised by the Minister and the Minis-
ter’s delegates (primarily officers of DPIW).
 Section 165G of the Act expressly imposes a duty on all 
dam owners to, so far as is reasonably practicable, maintain 
and operate their dams so as not to cause, or be likely to cause, 
material environmental harm or serious environmental harm or 
danger to any person or property. Part 8A of the Act gives wide 
powers to the Minister to supervise and ensure the safety of all 
registered dams and that owners are not in breach of their duty. 
As part of this role, the Minister has specific functions under 
the Act (Section 165C) which include: 
• Maintaining a register of all dams
• Ensuring all dams comply with requisite standards of 
design, construction, maintenance and review as specified 
under the Regulations
• Obtaining information and keeping records on matters 
relating to the safety of dams.
Dam owners can be obligated to provide information on their 
dams either as a condition of a permit under Section 157 of 
the Act or from a direct order from the Minister under vari-
ous other sections relating mainly to ongoing surveillance and 
maintenance (e.g. Sections 165F(2), 165H, 165J, 165L, 165M or 
165N). 
 The Regulations 2003 for the most part provide prescribed 
standards for the competency of persons undertaking design, 
construction, maintenance and surveillance of dams, based on 
their hazard categories. The competency of such persons are 
classified as either ‘any person’, ‘the owner’, persons of either 
‘Class A’, ‘Class B’ or ‘Class C’ competence, or an ‘Expert 
Team’. Definitions of these classes of persons in Section 6 of 
the Regulations include:
• Class A – a professional engineer with relevant experience 
in the investigation, design, construction, and day-to-day 
safety management of dams of a height, type and hazard 
category similar to the relevant dam 
• Class B – a professional engineer with relevant experience 
in dam technology appropriate to the relevant dam
• Class C – a professional technical specialist with relevant 
tertiary qualifications and relevant specialist experience in 
the investigation, design, construction or day-to-day safety 
management of dams of a height, type and hazard category 
similar to the relevant dam
• An Expert Team – at least one of the persons has Class B 
competence, and the persons collectively have a knowl-
edge and understanding of the causes and modes of dam 
failure and also have professional expertise in the follow-
ing areas in so far as they relate to the relevant dam and 
activity: engineering surveying, hydrology, hydraulics, 
engineering geology, soil and rock mechanics, proper-
ties of materials, dam design, structural and mechanical 
design.
Section 7 of the Regulations then provides for varying 
‘required competency standards’ criteria based on the height 
of the dam, hazard category of the dam, and the type of 
activity/information to be undertaken/provided. An example 
of these criteria is provided in Table 3, which is applicable 
to dams up to 10 m in height. Other similar criteria are also 
provided in Section 7 of the Regulations for dams between  
10 m and 25 m high, and for those greater than 25 m high. 
Section 9(1) of the Regulations requires that hazard categories 
be assessed in accordance with national guidelines published 
by ANCOLD (e.g. ANCOLD 2000a and 2000b). Similarly, all 
standards of design and safety management must comply with 
ANCOLD guidelines: this includes spillway design standards 
(ANCOLD, 2000b), the frequency and thoroughness of sur-
veillance and review (ANCOLD, 2003) and any requirements 
for emergency action plans (ANCOLD, 2003). These guide-
lines are generally in line with international best-practice as 
determined by Pisaniello and McKay (1998) and Bradlow et 
al. (2002). 
 It is clear from Table 3 and Section 7 of the Regulations 
that the legislation in Tasmania encompasses all dams, large 
and small, low and greater hazard and clearly sets out the 
level of ongoing safety surveillance. DPIWE (2003) indi-
cates that the owners of significant to high hazard dams are 
required to arrange safety inspections and reports by an 
experienced dam engineer after the initial filling of the res-
ervoir and generally every 5 years during the life of the dam 
– for typical higher hazard irrigation dams in this category 
these reports can be expected to cost around AU$2 000 
(ZAR12 860). At the same time, in order to avoid placing 
significant cost burdens upon owners of smaller, less haz-
ardous dams, these do not require full engineering reports; 
these reports may be prepared by the owner by completing a 
pro forma document supplied by the Department (DPIWE, 
2003). DPIW have recognised that a cost-effective spillway 
design/review mechanism such as that reported in Pisaniello 
and McKay (2003 and 2005), if developed in Tasmania, 
would well complement this ‘pro forma’ process. Hence, 
DPIW in June 2008 commissioned the University of South 
Australia to undertake a pilot project to develop such tech-
nology in Tasmania. The results will be reported in a future 
paper.
 There is no fee for registering dams. The policy looks to 
have all existing dams registered; any new dams are registered 
when they are granted a permit and the permit application fee 
covers this. The permit process for new dams is described in 
greater detail by DPIW (2008) and illustrated by IRIS Tasma-
nia (2008).  Fees for permits are set by the Water Management 
Regulations 1999 (per Schedule 4, Part 2).  Current fees are: 
381 fee units plus:
• 54 fee units for each hour spent in processing the applica-
tion (excluding the first 7 h)
• 214 fee units where the application requires a notice under 
section 149 of the Act- most dam permits require advertis-
ing so this is the advertising cost
• 421 fee units where the assessment is made by the Assess-
ment Committee.
Fee units are currently worth AU$1.28 (ZAR8.23). It is 
important to note that applications for smaller, straightfor-
ward dams can be assessed by the Department under delega-
tion from the Assessment Committee (IRIS Tasmania, 2008). 
This works well to minimise costs and fast-track these  
‘simpler’ applications. 
 Regional Water Management Officers employed by the 
Department make the initial assessment of a dam’s hazard 
when they do a field inspection of the proposed or existing dam 
site. This is then checked internally by the Department and if 
there is any doubt then a conservative approach is taken and/or 
the proponent is required to have the matter formally reviewed 
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by an engineer. A dam’s hazard potential will then determine 
the Department’s mandates as to the frequency of surveillance 
inspections, reports, safety reviews, and emergency action 
plans in line mainly with ANCOLD’s Guidelines on Dam 
Safety Management (2003).
 The Water Management (Safety of Dams) Regulations 
2003, Section 13(1) also requires that dam owners pay a fee to 
the Crown for assessing design, construction, maintenance, 
surveillance or decommissioning reports in respect of one or 
more dams as follows:  25 fee units for the first dam; and 20 
fee units for each 0.5 h spent in assessing the report – but not 
exceeding a total of 250 fee units. This, together with the incre-
mental fee structure for permits outlined above, provides an 
innovative and equitable user-pays type method for subsidising 
the dam- safety assurance policy in Tasmania.
 Monetary penalties are provided for under the Act and 
attach to any person failing to comply with any provisions 
of the Act or orders made under the Act. For example, a 
maximum fine of 100 penalty units applies to any person 
failing to provide information to the Minister on the safety 
of their dam under Section 165H, and a maximum fine of 
200 penalty units and a daily fine not exceeding 20 penalty 
units (for each day during which the offence continues) 
attaches to any person failing to comply with a maintenance 
order under Section 165L. Body corporates attract fines 2.5 
times these levels. Penalty units are currently worth AU$120 
(ZAR772). These are serious penalties and are in line with 
international best practice as identified by Pisaniello and 
McKay (1998).
 Finally, the Department provides for substantial owner edu-
cation and guidance through the publication of website infor-
mation and articles in Departmental and other publications, see 
for example DPIWE (2003), DPIW (2007) and DPIW (2008).
How the policy is progressing – Feedback from key 
policy actors
DPIWE (2005) reported that implementation of dam-safety 
legislation and regulations following amendment to the Act 
in 2002 now ensure that best practice safety procedures are 
followed in the construction, maintenance and surveillance of 
dams in Tasmania. 
 As of 2005, there were 5 674 registered dams in Tasmania 
(DPIWE, 2005). Currently there are around 8 000 (Ditchfield,  
2008). This increase is due to the new dams (around 200 per 
year) that have been built since 2005 as well as many existing 
dams having been identified and registered for the first time 
– evidence that the policy is being administered effectively. 
Around 500 of the registered dams are of either significant haz-
ard or higher (Ditchfield, 2008), i.e. being sufficiently hazard-
ous to require extensive ongoing statutory safety surveillance 
and reporting. All of these dams have been placed on a ‘pre-
scribed dams’ register within the DPIW dam database. Around 
66% of the prescribed dams are privately owned. From 2003 to 
TABLE 3
Required competency standards under Tasmanian legislation for all dams up to 10 m in height 
(Source:  Water Management (Safety of Dams) Regulations 2003, Section 7)
Activity ANCOLD hazard category*
Very low Low Significant High C High B High A Extreme
1. Supervision of construc-
tion







tigation, design and report, 
other than spillway design




































(a) Class A, if the 
dam is more than 7 m 
high; or (b) Owner, if 
the dam is not more 
than 7 m high.






5. Comprehensive or interme-










6. Safety reviews Any 
person















(a) Class B, if the 
dam is more than 
7 m high; or (b) 
owner, if the dam is 
not more than 7 m 
high
Class B Class B Class B Class B Class B
*ANCOLD (2000a and 2000b) provides further details on these hazard classifications
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2005, 218 notices had been sent requiring prescribed dam own-
ers to undertake a dam-safety surveillance inspection (DPIWE, 
2005). In 2008, a further 350 prescribed dam notices will be 
sent requiring hazard rating review, surveillance and inspection 
(Ditchfield,  2008).
 The progress of the Tasmanian policy and the problems 
identified by this paper were formally discussed with the 
Water Management Group of the Department of Primary 
Industries and Water (DPIW) in Tasmania in October 2007 
and again in June 2008. The Group reported that it is taking 
considerable time, effort and resources for DPIW to identify 
all existing dams in Tasmania that should be included on 
the register, and to ensure that they comply with the dam-
safety legislation. Unfortunately resources to DPIW for this 
purpose are limited, so significant and high-hazard dams are 
currently being given priority in terms of strict enforcement 
of requisite safety and surveillance standards. Nevertheless, 
even low-hazard dams are targeted whenever a potential 
cascade failure scenario arises. Such scenarios are common 
throughout the State. DPIW gives careful consideration to 
these scenarios and does upgrade the hazard rating of smaller 
dams to a higher level, when appropriate, so that stronger 
surveillance, reporting and safety standards are imposed. For 
the many other lower-hazard dams in the State, DPIW have 
indicated that these will eventually all be identified using field 
surveillance officers, satellite imagery and other mapping 
techniques, and entered onto the register. The 5-yearly sur-
veillance reports mandated by the dam-safety regulations will 
then also be strictly imposed on these dams. Inevitably, as all 
dams throughout Tasmania are discovered and come onto the 
register, the cumulative threats posed by small dams in catch-
ments will be minimised in the State.
Summary and discussion
There is a clear need in areas where potentially hazardous 
private dams exist to ensure that owners review and main-
tain their dams in line with current acceptable practice and 
take appropriate remedial action where necessary. Adequate 
assurance can only be provided through the implementation 
of appropriate policy which requires the backing of legisla-
tion. The experience of NSW demonstrates that dam-safety 
programs are workable and not too costly as the NSW Dams 
Safety Committee operates on a small annual budget of 
around AU$1 000 000 (ZAR6 430 000). Elements of best 
practice can and do exist successfully to control the safety 
management of private dams and in turn provide increased 
dam-safety assurance to the public and promote the ideals of 
reducing loss of life as well as environmental and economic 
losses. The results of the NSW ‘supervised dams’ case study 
presented here clearly shows this.
 However, the policy must also be extensive enough to ensure 
that all potentially hazardous dams are supervised: this usually 
means that adequate funding must be made available for com-
plete administration of the policy, and for an adequate register 
of all dams to be maintained. For example, in NSW additional 
government funding and some form of user pays principle may be 
required if the safety committee extended its remit: the ‘non-su-
pervised dams’ case study reported here demonstrates this need. 
Tasmania provides an innovative and equitable user-pays method 
for helping government to subsidise dams safety assurance policy, 
and sets a good example for other jurisdictions to follow.
 While NSW has strong dam-safety assurance policy in 
place, and other mainland states have made good positive  
in-roads (e.g. Queensland and Victoria), each mainland State 
also needs to address the considerable risks associated with 
cumulative failure of small dams. Most small dams individu-
ally pose only a minimal hazard, but when considered cumu-
latively in a catchment above, say, a large hazardous public 
dam, they can pose significant risk to premature breach of 
the public dam, and in turn, extremely serious consequences 
further downstream. Maintaining an adequate register of all 
dams, large or small, high or lower hazard provides a mecha-
nism for having some control over the spillway capacities of 
the multitude of small dams that may exist in a jurisdiction. 
Further research is needed to critically determine whether all 
such small dams should be designed to the same high hazard 
category standard of the end-of-line dam and in what circum-
stances. However, it has been made clear that they should be 
mandated, as a bare minimum, to meet the ANCOLD fall-back 
spillway design standard for low-hazard dams (i.e. 1 in 100 to  
1 in 1 000 years design flood). 
 In this respect, Tasmania provides the ‘model’ on how 
this can be best achieved. The Tasmanian approach is in line 
with international best-practice dam-safety assurance policy, 
and is the only State in Australia thus far to acknowledge that 
even small, low-hazard dams need to be supervised, albeit to a 
modest extent. Cost burdens to small-dam owners can also be 
minimised by making available affordable design/review proc-
esses such as the simple pro-forma used in Tasmania and the 
cost-effective flood capability design/review procedure used 
here in the NSW case studies. This is a good way that govern-
ments can ensure that not only the larger potentially hazardous 
dams are kept safe, but also the cumulative safety threats posed 
by small dams are kept in check.
Conclusion
At an international level, much attention is being devoted to the 
safety of medium to large-scale dams. This paper has estab-
lished a clear need to also address the serious potential prob-
lems associated with smaller dams, particularly the potential 
cumulative safety threats they pose in catchments.  This need 
is supported by both past experience with bad cumulative style 
dam failures in a number of countries, and by recent research in 
South Australia into this novel area of cumulative risk.
 Different jurisdictions attempt to tackle dam safety at 
different levels. But even the strongest of dam safety policy 
can fall short when it comes to managing the very real safety 
threats associated with populations of small dams at the cumu-
lative level. The NSW case-study results have demonstrated 
this and provided valuable lessons. For example, the impor-
tance of registering all dams and the need for some form of 
supervision of even small dams due to either their individual or 
cumulative hazard potential. The State of Tasmania has pro-
vided a ‘model’ on how this can be best achieved in line with 
international best-practice. 
 The lessons in this paper can provide guidance to any juris-
diction in Australia and abroad that has populations of small 
dams in catchments posing either individual or cumulative 
safety threats to downstream communities, as well as guidance 
to implement policy that achieves better management of small 
dams for sustainable and safe catchments.
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